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Abstract
The purpose of the paper is to give new key agreement protocols (a multi-party
extension of the protocol due to Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld and a generalization of the
Diffie-Hellman protocol from abelian to solvable groups) and a new homomorphic
public-key cryptosystem. They rely on difficulty of the conjugacy and membership
problems for subgroups of a given group. To support these and other known cryp-
tographic schemes we present a general technique to produce a family of instances
being matrix groups (over finite commutative rings) which play a role for these
schemes similar to the groups Z∗n in the existing cryptographic constructions like
RSA or discrete logarithm.
∗Partially supported by RFFI, grants, 03-01-00349, NSH-2251.2003.1. The paper was done during the
stay of the author at the Mathematical Institute of the University of Rennes.
1
Introduction
One of the oldest cryptographical problems consists in constructing of a key agreement
protocol. Roughly speaking it is a multi-party algorithm, defined by a sequence of steps,
specifying the actions of two or more parties in order a shared secret becomes available
to two or more parties. Probably the first such procedure based on abelian groups is
due to Diffie-Hellman one (see [7]). In fact, it concerns automorphisms of abelian (even
cyclic) groups induced by taking to a power. Some generalizations of this protocol to non-
abelian groups (in particular, the matrix groups over some rings) were suggested in [21]
where security was based on an analog of the discrete logarithm problems in groups of
inner automorphisms. Certain variations of the Diffie-Hellman systems over the braid
groups were described in [13]; there several trapdoor one-way functions connected with
the conjugacy and the taking root problems in the braid groups were proposed. Recently,
a general scheme for constructing key agreement protocols based on algebraic structures
was proposed in [1]. In principle, it enables us to construct such protocols for non-abelian
groups and their automorphisms induced by conjugations. In this paper we generalize
to the non-abelian case the Diffie-Hellman protocol, construct multi party procedure for
the protocol [1], and analyze the security of both protocols realized in matrix groups over
rings.
The question on finding probabilistic public-key cryptosystems in which the decryp-
tion function has a homomorphic property goes back to [22] (see also [6]). In such a
cryptosystem the spaces of messages and of ciphertexts are algebraic structures G and
H and the decryption function D : G → H is a homomorphism. A number of such
cryptosystems is known for abelian groups, e.g. the quadratic residue cryptosystem [7]
and its generalization for highest residues [20] (see also an overview in [10]). In most of
them the security is based on the intractability of theoretical number problems close to
the integer factoring. Recently, several homomorphic cryptosystems were constructed for
infinite (but finitely presented) groups, see [10, 11] and references there. In this paper we
construct one more homomorphic cryptosystem with G being a free group the trapdoor
of which uses a secret permutation of the generators of G.
The third problem considered in this paper is how to produce instances for cryptosys-
tems based on computations with matrix groups over rings. In contrast to numerous
theoretical cryptosystems where there is a lot of efficient algorithms to generate integers
with given properties (e.g., the pairs of two distinct large primes of the same bit size
used in the quadratic residue cryptosystem), it is not clear a priory how to find efficiently
matrix groups in which some problems (like membership or conjugacy) arising in cryptog-
raphy are computationally difficult. We propose a general scheme for solving this problem
and give a specialization of this scheme for matrix groups over finite commutative rings.
In Section 1 we study key agreement protocols between two parties (named usually
Alice and Bob). The security of the Diffie-Hellman protocol relies on the difficulty of the
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following transporter problem: having an action G× V → V of a group G on a set V for
given u, v ∈ V to find g ∈ G (provided that it does exist) such that (g, u) 7→ v. In case of
V being a cyclic group of order n and G being a group acting on V by taking a power one
arrives to the discrete logarithm problem (usually, n is taken to be prime). The security
of the key agreement protocol of [1] (see also Subsection 1.1) relies on the difficulty of
the conjugacy problem with respect to a subgroup of G. In Subsection 1.1 we extend
the construction of [1] to multi-party key agreement protocol. Then in Subsection 1.2 we
design another generalization of the Diffie-Hellman protocol to actions of groups G which
satisfy a certain identity. Clearly, any abelian group satisfies the identity aba−1b−1 = 1
and more generally, any solvable group with a fixed length of its derived series satisfies
an appropriate commutator identity. The security of our protocol again relies on the
difficulty of the transporter problem for a suitable action of G.
In Section 2 we consider homomorphic public key cryptosystems (see e.g. [10]) in which
the decrypting function (known to Alice) is a group homomorphism f : G → H where
the groups H,G play the roles of the spaces of plain and ciphertext messages respectively.
Usually, the security of a homomorphic cryptosystem relies on the difficulty of the problem
of the membership to a normal subgroup of G (here, the kernel of f). Also in Section 2
we describe a homomorphic cryptosystem in which as G a free group is taken. This
cryptosystem modifies one from [11] where as G a subgroup of the modular group SL2(Z)
was considered. The security of this cryptosystem relies on the difficulty of a certain word
problem. A private key of Alice is an appropriate permutation of the generators of the
free group G, this differs our cryptosystem from the one produced in [5].
The crucial role in the classical cryptographic constructions (like RSA, discrete loga-
rithm or quadratic residue [7]) plays the natural action of the group Aut(Z∗n) on the group
Z
∗
n. So, varying n one gets a mass pool of instances for cryptographic primitives. This
action is a special case of the natural action of the group AutR(V ) (viewed as a matrix
group) on the free module V over the ring R. In this paper we propose a construction
of a pool of matrix groups instances for cryptographic primitives (Subsection 3.2). The
security of these instances relies on the difficulty of certain problems on matrix groups
(e.g. the membership to a subgroup or the conjugacy with respect to a subgroup). For
the complexity of such problems few results were established in case of matrix groups over
fields [3, 12]; for matrix groups over arbitrary rings much less is known.
The common way in cryptography of producing a trapdoor and a cryptosystem, is to
generate a private key departing from a pair of primes p, q, while their product n = pq
plays the role of a public key. In our scheme (see Subsection 3.1) as a private key we take
a rooted tree whose leaves being furnished with specially chosen (non-abelian, in general)
groups. We assume that Alice has in possession such representations of these groups
which allow her to solve efficiently a problem lying in the background of a cryptosystem
(like membership or conjugacy). Internal vertices of the tree are endowed with certain
operations on groups which allow one to assign recursively a group to each vertex of the
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tree starting with its leaves. At the end of the recursion a group is assigned to the root,
and this group plays the role of a public key. This scheme is also modified to produce a
homomorphism of matrix groups as a public key. In Subsection 3.2 we give a realization
of this general scheme in finite matrix groups.
The similarity of the common constructions in cryptography based on commutative
groups (say. Z∗n) with our construction (relying on finite matrix groups) allows us to call
the latter type of constructions the non-commutative cryptography.
1 Group theoretical key agreement protocol
1.1 A multi-party protocol. The following group theoretical variant of key agreement
two-party protocol was proposed in [1]. Let G be a group, and to two parties A and B
are assigned their subgroups
GA = 〈a1, . . . , am〉, GB = 〈b1, . . . , bn〉. (1)
The group G and the elements ai, bj are publicly known. The parties A and B choose
secret elements a ∈ GA and b ∈ GB and transmit to each other the collections
XB = {a
−1bja}
n
j=1, XA = {b
−1aib}
m
i=1
respectively. Since A (resp. B) has a representation of the element a (resp. b) via
generators a1, . . . , am (resp. b1, . . . , bn), then A (resp. B) can compute a representation
of the element b−1ab (resp. a−1ba) via elements of the set XA (resp. XB). Thus A and B
have a common key
a−1(b−1ab) = [a, b] = (a−1ba)−1b.
An obvious necessary condition for this protocol to be secure is that the set of all such
commutators with a ∈ GA, and b ∈ GB would contain at least two elements.
Let us describe a generalization of the group theoretical key agreement protocol for s
parties with s ≥ 2 and a single public communicating channel. Without loss of generality
we assume that s = 2t for some t ≥ 1, for otherwise in the recursive construction below
we divide the parties into two unequal subsets which leads just to slight changing the
notation. As in the case s = 2 the groups G1, . . . , Gs ⊂ G of the parties are given
publically by their sets of generators. At the initial step the ith party chooses a secret key
ai ∈ Gi, i = 1, . . . , s. Let S1 and S2 be disjoint s/2-subsets of the set {1, . . . , s}. Then
given u = 1, 2 the parties from Su recursively construct the common key Ku ∈ G, such
that for all i ∈ Su there exist integers εi,j ∈ {−1,+1} and 1 ≤ mi ≤ s/2, and certain
elements Bi,1, . . . , Bi,mi ∈ 〈{aj : j ∈ Su,i}〉 with Su,i = Su \ {i}, for which we have
Ku = (B
−1
i,1 a
εi,1
i Bi,1) · · · (B
−1
i,mi
a
εi,mi
i Bi,mi).
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By recursion we can assume that the ith party knows the elements B−1i,j aBi,j for all j and
for all chosen generators a of the group Gi (and thereby, it knows B
−1
i,j aiBi,j), but does not
necessary know Bi,j. At this point the party i ∈ Su sends the elements B
−1
i,j aBi,j for all
the chosen generators a of the group Gi to a certain party from the set Su′ with u
′ = 3−u
and asks for the elements K−1u′ B
−1
i,j aBi,jKu′. Then for u = 1 the ith party computes the
element
[K1, K2] = K
−1
1 (K
−1
2 K1K2) = K
−1
1 (K
−1
2 (B
−1
i,mi
a
εi,mi
i Bi,mi)K2) · · · (K
−1
2 (B
−1
i,1 a
εi,1
i Bi,1)K2).
Similarly, for u = 2 the ith party computes the element [K1, K2] = (K
−1
1 K2K1)
−1K2.
Thus this element can be chosen as the common key for all parties. It is easy to see that
the ith party computes the common key in O(s|ai|) operations in the group G, where |ai|
denotes the length of the word ai in the chosen generators of the group Gi.
1.2 A new protocol. In this subsection we define a new group-theoretical two party
key agreement protocol that can be viewed as a non-commutative generalization of the
Diffie-Hellman protocol (see [7]).
Let G be a group acting on a set X so that given (x, g) ∈ X × G the image xg of
x with respect to g can be efficiently computed. Two parties A and B going to choose
a secret common key from X, fix publically subgroups GA, GB of the group G and two
words
WA(uA, uB) = u
a1,1
A u
b1,1
B · · ·u
a1,m1
A , WB(uA, uB) = u
b2,1
B u
a2,1
A · · ·u
b2,m2
B
of the free group F2 with two free generators uA, uB such that
(W1) m1, m2 ∈ N, ai,j , bi,j ∈ Z for all i, j, and a1,m1 6= 0, b2,m2 6= 0,
(W2) WA(gA, gB) = WB(gA, gB) for all (gA, gB) ∈ GA ×GB.
The protocol begins with the choice of a publically known element x0 ∈ X and the secret
elements gA ∈ GA by the party A and gB ∈ GB by the party B. Then during the
communications the party A performs the following:
– Set KA = x0.
– For i = 1, . . . , m1 − 1 send K
gA
a1,i
A and receive KA := K
gA
a1,igB
b1,i
A .
– Set KA := K
gA
a1,m1
A .
The communications of the party B are defined similarly. Thus at the end of the com-
munication process due to condition (W2) the parties A and B have the common key
KA = x
WA(gA,gB)
0 = x
WB(gA,gB)
0 = KB.
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For X = Z∗p with p being a prime, G = GA = GB being the group Z
∗
p−1
∼= Aut(Z∗p) and
WA(uA, uB) = uBuA, WB(uA, uB) = uAuB we come to the Diffie-Hellman protocol.
This scheme can be easily realized for a solvable group G with bounded length n of
the derived series of G. For example, one can take GA = GB = G and choose the words
WA = WA,n and WB = WB,n by induction on n as follows. If n = 1, then the group G is
abelian and so conditions (W1) and (W2) are satisfied for
WA,1(uA, uB) = uBuA, WB,1(uA, uB) = uAuB.
For n ≥ 2 the commutator [g, h] = g−1h−1gh with arbitrary g, h ∈ G belongs to the
derived subgroup G′ = [G,G] of G (the derived length of G′ equals n − 1). Assume
by induction that conditions (W1) and (W2) are satisfied for the words WA,n−1 and
WB,n−1. Then a straightforward checking shows that these conditions are also satisfied,
for example, for the words
WA,n = WA,n−1([uB, uA], [u
−1
A , u
−1
B ]), WB,n =WB,n−1([uB, uA], [u
−1
A , u
−1
B ]).
This follows from the fact that the length (the number of letters) of the word WA,n (as
well as WB,n) equals 2 · 4
n−1 which one can verify by induction on n ≥ 1. More generally,
to define WA,n and WB,n one can choose arbitrary words W1,W2,W3,W4 ∈ WX where
X = {uA, uB} and WX is the set of all words in the alphabet X
±, and use [W1,W2] and
[W3,W4] instead of [uA, uB] and [u
−1
B , u
−1
A ] respectively. Certainly, to provide condition
(1) one should guarantee that the words WA,n−1(uA, uB) (resp. WB,n−1(uA, uB)) and W2
(res. W4) must be terminated to uA (resp. uB). To avoid triviality we also should take
W1, . . . ,W4 so that WA,n and WB,n would be nonidentity elements in the underlying free
group.
Clearly, any realization of the above protocol is based on identities of the group G.
In addition to commutator identities for solvable groups (see above) one can also use the
identity xm = 1 (that holds in any finite group the order of which is a divisor of m, and in
the Burnside groups). In this case we can choose as the words WA and WB the prefix and
the inverse of the suffix of the word (uAuB)
m, respectively, so that the prefix is terminated
to uA. In fact, as it was proved by B.Neumann any variety of groups can be given by a
collection of identities such that the first of them is of the form xm = 1 with m being
a nonnegative integer, whereas the other ones are the elements of the commutant of the
underlying free group (see [16]).
We complete the subsection by making two remarks on the above protocol. First,
the set X must be of superpolynomial size, for otherwise the key agreement scheme
can be broken in polynomial time by the known permutation group theory technique
(see [15]). Second, the words WA and WB must be chosen so that the number of elements
WA(gA, gB) = WB(gA, gB) with gA, gB ∈ G would contain at least two elements.
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1.3 On the security of the protocols. In the above protocols we assume that all
groups are given explicitly, e.g. by sets of generators, so that the group operations can be
performed efficiently. Then the security of the first protocol is based on the intractability
of the following problem (see [23]).
Subgroup Conjugation Search Problem (SCSP). Given a group G, subgroups
H1, H2 of G, and two elements f, g ∈ H1, find an element h ∈ H2 such that f = h
−1gh,
provided that at least one such h exists.
As usually in the cryptography, an efficient algorithm solving SCSP would break the
protocol (but to break the protocol it is not necessary to solve SCSP). Such an algorithm
does exist for G = GL(n,Fq) where n is a natural number, Fq is a finite field of the order q,
and the subalgebra A(H2) of the full matrix algebra Matn(Fq) generated by the group H2
is such that
A(H2) ∩G = H2.
Then for arbitrary H1 the problem SCSP can be solved in probabilistic polynomial time
(in n and in log q) by the linear algebra technique, provided that n is less than q/2. Indeed,
in this case the solution of the linear system hf − gh = 0 with respect to h ∈ A(H2) is an
element of H2 with a great probability. (From [4] it follows that in this case the problem
SCSP can be solved efficiently even by a deterministic algorithm.)
It seems that the problem SCSP remains difficult when G is restricted to subgroups
of the group GL(V,R) of all invertible R-linear transformations of the free R-module V
where R is a finite commutative ring. To see this we consider the Linear Transporter
Problem on the intractability of which the second protocol is based.
Linear Transporter Problem (LTP). Let R be a commutative ring, V be an R-module
and G ≤ GL(V,R). Given u ∈ V and v ∈ uG = {ug : g ∈ G} find g ∈ G such that
v = ug.
A special case of (LTP) is the Discrete Logarithm Problem. Indeed, take V = Z∗p with
p being a prime. Then V can be considered as an one-dimensional module over the ring
R = End(V ) ∼= Zp−1 (with respect to taking the power v 7→ v
n where v ∈ V , n ∈ Zp−1).
Choosing u to be a generator of the group V we come to the Discrete Logarithm Problem.
Preserving the notation of LTP set T (V ) = {Tv : x 7→ x + v, v, x ∈ V } to be the
translation group of the R-module V . Then obviously
v = ug ⇔ Tv = g
−1Tug, u, v ∈ V, g ∈ GL(V,R).
So the problem LTP is the special case of the problem SCSP with G = AGL(V,R),
H1 = T (V ) and H2 = GL(V,R). (Here AGL(V,R) = T (V )GL(V,R) is the group of
all affine transformations of V .) This shows that SCSP is at least as hard as LTP. In
particular, this construction gives us a family of groups for which the problem SCSP
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turns to be at least as hard as the Discrete Logarithm Problem. A general technique to
construct groups of this kind will be given in Section 3.
2 Homomorphic cryptosystems over groups
2.1 A general scheme. A homomorphic cryptosystem is a probabilistic public key
scheme (in the sense of [7]) in which the spaces of plaintext messages and ciphertexts
are groups Hk and Gk respectively, depending on a security parameter k and such that
its decryption function
fk : Gk → Hk (2)
is an epimorphism for all k. Usually, in a homomorphic cryptosystem the public key
includes generator sets Xk and Yk of the groups Gk and Hk, and some set Rk ⊂ Xk such
that Yk ⊂ fk(Rk) = {fk(g) : g ∈ Rk}. Besides, it is assumed that there are publically
known kO(1)-algorithms to solve the following problems:
(1) given two elements a, b of Gk (resp. Hk) find the element ab
−1,
(2) given y ∈ Yk find an element of the set Rk ∩ f
−1
k (y),
(3) generate a random element of the group ker(fk)
where sizes of all elements are assumed to be at most k. Under these assumptions the en-
cryption can be performed in time kO(1) as follows. First, given a message h = y1 · · · ym ∈
Hk with yi ∈ Yk and m being a natural number at most k
O(1), Bob computes in time
polynomial in k an element r = r1 · · · rm ∈ Gk such that ri ∈ Rk and fk(ri) = yi for all i.
Second, Bob mixes r with random elements g1, · · · , gm+1 ∈ Gk belonging to the kernel of
the homomorphism fk and outputs the element g = g1r1g2 · · · gmrmgm+1 as the ciphertext
of h. Alice being able to compute fk efficiently performs the decoding as follows:
fk(g) = fk(g1r1g2 · · · gmrmgm+1) = fk(r1) · · ·fk(rm) = y1 · · · ym = h.
The key point of such a system is to choose a presentation of the group Gk and the
epimorphism fk in order to provide the inverse of fk to be a trapdoor function. The exact
definition of homomorphic public-key cryptosystems and a survey of constructions can be
found in [10, 11].
One way to implement the general concept of a homomorphic cryptosystem is to take
Gk to be a subgroup of a certain group F such that the group operations in F can be
performed in time polynomial in the size of operands. In the cryptosystems from [10]
and [11] the group F was taken as a free product of abelian groups and a modular group,
respectively. In these cryptosystems the restriction of the mapping fk to the set Rk was
known publically and one can produce efficiently random kO(1)-size elements of the group
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ker(fk). In fact, the security of these cryptosystems was based on the difficulty of the
membership problem (see below) for special subgroups of the group Gk. In the next
subsection we present a new homomorphic public-key cryptosystem of this kind (but with
another trapdoor).
2.2 A new homomorphic scheme. Let H = 〈Y ;R〉 be a finitely presented group
generated by the set Y of cardinality k ≥ 2 with R ⊂ WY as the set of relations. As the
group F mentioned above we take the free group 〈Y 〉. For a permutation σ ∈ Sym(Y )
denote by ϕσ the automorphism of the group F induced by σ. Set
X = Xσ = {ϕ
−1
σ (ryyr
′
y) : y ∈ Y } (3)
where ry and r
′
y are randomly chosen words of size O(k) belonging to the set WR ⊂ WY .
Then G = 〈X〉 is a subgroup of the group F . Moreover, the mapping fσ : G→ H defined
by a commutative diagram
G
fσ
−→ HyidG
xρ
F
ϕσ
−→ F
(4)
where ρ : F → H is the epimorphism induced by the mapping idY , is an epimorphism
such that given x ∈ X we have (see (3)):
fσ(x) = ρ(ϕσ(x)) = ρ(ϕσ(ϕ
−1
σ (ryyr
′
y))) = ρ(ryyr
′
y) = ρ(ry)ρ(y)ρ(r
′
y) = ρ(y) = y
where y is the element of Y for which x = ϕ−1σ (ryyr
′
y) (see (3)). In particular, fσ(X) = Y
and the restriction of fσ to X is a bijection. This enables us to construct a homomorphic
cryptosystem as follows.
Secret Key: the permutation σ ∈ Sym(Y ).
Public Key: a natural number k ≥ 2, a group H = 〈Y ;R〉 with |Y | = k, a subgroup
G = 〈Xσ〉 of the free group F = 〈Y 〉, and the bijection f : Xσ → Y coinciding with the
restriction of the homomorphism fσ to Xσ.
Encryption: a message M = yi1 · · · yit ∈ H where yij ∈ Y
±, is encrypted by the element
E(M) = f−1(s1yi1s
′
1) · · ·f
−1(styits
′
t) ∈ G
where si and s
′
i are random words of the set WR ⊂ WY of size O(k), and for a word
w = · · · y · · · ∈WY we set f
−1(w) = · · · f−1(y) · · · .
Decryption: a ciphertext C = yi1 · · · yit ∈ G ⊂ F where yij ∈ Y
±, is decrypted to
D(C) = yσi1 · · · y
σ
it
∈ H .
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To prove the correctness of the decryption we note that f = (fσ)|Xσ , fσ = ρ(ϕσ)|G,
and ϕσ(y) = y
σ for all y ∈ Y (see (4)). Since obviously ϕ−1σ = ϕσ−1 , we have
D(E(yi1 · · · yit)) = D(f
−1(s1yi1s
′
1) · · ·f
−1(styits
′
t)) = D(ϕσ−1(s1yi1s
′
1 · · · styits
′
t)) =
ϕσ−1(s1yi1s
′
1)
σ · · ·ϕσ−1(styits
′
t)
σ = s1yi1s
′
1 · · · styits
′
t = yi1 · · · yit .
Clearly, that both encryption and decryption algorithms are polynomial-time in the size
of the input words.
The security of the homomorphic cryptosystem will be discussed in the next subsection.
Here we only make several remarks on the possible implementations. First, we note that
it is not necessary to work with words; instead of this one can use a matrix representation
of the group F (see [11]). Next, to choose the set Y so that |Y | = k, one can take any
set S of generators of H and add to it k − |S| random elements of H whenever |S| < k.
Finally, as in Section 1 any implementation of the above cryptosystem must be supported
by sufficiently large class of candidates for groups H . We will return to this problem in
Section 3.
2.3 On the security of homomorphic schemes. Concerning the security of the ho-
momorphic cryptosystem suppose first that the order of the group H is at most kO(1) (e.g.
such an assumption was done in [10]). Then using the generator set Y of H one can list
all the elements h1, . . . , hm of this group in time k
O(1) and then to find within the same
time a set {g1, . . . , gm} of distinct representatives of right cosets of G by Gσ = ker(fσ)
(one can set gi = f
−1(hi) for all i). Now if an adversary Charlie could recognize efficiently
the elements of G belonging to Gσ, then he would efficiently compute fσ(g) for all g ∈ G
due to the formulae
fσ(g) = fσ(gi) ⇔ gg
−1
i ∈ Gσ
where i ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Thus in this case the security of our cryptosystem is based on the
intractability of the following problem:
Membership Testing (MT). Given a group F and its subgroup G test whether a given
g ∈ F belongs to G.
Suppose now that the order of H to be arbitrary. Then a quite natural way to break
the cryptosystem is to find an expression of any g ∈ G in the terms of generators belonging
to the set Xσ (the attack of this kind was considered in [11]). Indeed, if Charlie could
find efficiently for any element g ∈ G an expression g = x1 · · ·xm where xi ∈ X
±
σ for all i,
then he would efficiently compute fσ(g) due to formulae
fσ(g) = fσ(x1) · · · fσ(xm) = f(x1) · · · f(xm)
(we recall that the bijection f : Xσ → Y is given publically). Thus in this case we come
to the presentation problem (see [11]). The MT problem and the presentation problem
10
are closely related each to other (but generally could be not polynomial-time equivalent)
and one can combine them in the following well-known problem of computational group
theory (see [3]).
Constructive Membership Testing (CMT). Given a group F and its subgroup G
generated by a set X find an expression of a given g ∈ F as a word in X, or determine
that g 6∈ G.
Last two decades a great attention was paid to CMT with different presentations of
the group G. For example, if F is a subgroup of the symmetric group of degree n ≥ 1,
then the CMT can be solved in time nO(1) by the sift algorithm (see e.g. [15]). In the case
of groups F = GL(n,F) where F is an algebraic number field, there exists an effective
Las Vegas algorithm solving CMT [3]. However, for n = 1 and F being a finite field,
CMT is nothing else but the the Discrete Logarithm Problem. In [3] it was conjectured
that CMT is difficult whenever the group G either involves a large abelian group as a
quotient of a normal subgroup or has nonabelian composition factors which require large
degree permutation representations. Finally, the problem becomes much more difficult if
we take F = GL(n,R) the group of n× n invertible matrices over a ring R. In this case
the problem is undecidable for n = 4 and R = Z (see [18]).
3 Cryptographical generation of groups
3.1 A general scheme. We begin with a general scheme to construct a vast family of
groups and homomorphisms supporting both key agreement protocols of Section 1 and
homomorphic cryptosystems of Section 2. Let G be a class of groups closed with respect to
a set O of group-theoretical operations of different arities (like direct or wreath products).
For an integer s ≥ 1 we denote by Os a set of all operations of arity s belonging to O.
For a set G0 ⊂ G we define recursively a class P(G0,O) of pairs (G, T ) where G ∈ G and
T is a rooted labeled tree, as follows:
Base of recursion: any pair (G, T ) with G ∈ G0 and T being the one-point tree with
root labeled by G, belongs to P(G0,O).
Recursive step: given pairs (G1, T1), . . . , (Gs, Ts) ∈ P(G0,O) and an operation o ∈ Os,
the class P(G0,O) contains the pair (G, T ) where G = o(G1, . . . , Gs) and T is the tree
obtained from T1, . . . , Ts by adding a new root labeled by o and the sons being the roots
of T1, . . . , Ts.
Let (G, T ) ∈ P(G0,O). Then obviously G ∈ G and the derivation tree T of G provides
the constructive proof for this membership. The group G is uniquely determined by T
and we call it the group associated with T . The fact, that a derivation tree is an ordinary
rooted tree the leaves and the internal vertices of which are labeled by elements of G0 and
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O respectively, enables us to choose a random derivation tree of a fixed size.
Suppose from now on that all the groups of G are given in a certain way (e.g., one can
take as G a class of matrix groups given by generator sets). We assume also that for each
operation o ∈ Os and groups G1, . . . , Gs ∈ G, the size L(G) of the presentation of the
group G = o(G1, . . . , Gs) is at most O(L) where L =
∑s
i=1 L(Gi) and the group G can be
constructed from G1, . . . , Gs in time L
O(1). Let us define a size L(T ) of a derivation tree
T to be the sum of the sizes of all labels of T ; thus L(T ) includes the sizes of the groups
assigned to the leaves of T together with the number of edges of T . Then the size of any
pair (G, T ) ∈ P(G0,O) is O(L(T )), and the knowledge of T enables us to find G in time
polynomial in L(T ).
One of the problems arising in constructions of group-theoretical public key cryptosys-
tems is to find an efficient algorithm to produce a random group (or a collection of groups)
belonging to a special class G and with a given size L of the presentation. Such a group
G must be equipped with a private key providing an efficient solution of a certain com-
putational problem for G that is supposedly difficult in the class G without knowledge of
a private key. Our approach to the above problem is to choose an appropriate class G0
of groups, a set O of group-theoretical operations, and then to generate instances for the
cryptosystem in question as follows:
Step 1: given a security parameter L choose randomly groups G1, . . . , Gt ∈ G0, such that∑t
i=1 L(Gi) = O(L);
Step 2: choose randomly a rooted labeled tree T of size O(L) and with t leaves being
labeled by G1, . . . , Gt;
Step 3: compute the group G associated with T (i.e. (G, T ) ∈ P(G0,O));
Step 4: output the group G as a public key and the labeled tree T as a secret key.
Denote by G∗ the class of groups G such that (G, T ) ∈ P(G0,O) for some labeled tree
T . Then the secrecy of the key T is based on the intractability of the following problem:
given G ∈ G∗ find a derivation tree T associated with G. A special case of this problem
will be considered in Section 3.3.
For a homomorphic cryptosystem the above scheme is not sufficient because together
with the group G we have to provide a group H and a secret homomorphism f : G→ H .
To this end suppose that each group G ∈ G0 is equipped with a set M(G) of pairs
(H, f) where H ∈ G0 and f : G → H is a homomorphism. We also assume that given
homomorphisms fi : Gi → Hi with Gi, Hi ∈ G
∗ for i = 1, . . . , s, and an operation o ∈ Os
there exists an efficiently computed homomorphism f : G→ H where G = o(G1, . . . , Gs)
and H = o(H1, . . . , Hs) such that f |Gi = fi for all i (here we suppose in addition that
Gi is a subgroup of G). This homomorphism is denoted by o(f1, . . . , fs). In this notation
the set M(G0,O) of instances (G, f) for a homomorphic cryptosystem can be defined
recursively as follows:
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Base of recursion: any pair (G, f) with G ∈ G0 and f ∈ M(G) belongs to the set
M(G0,O);
Recursion step: given pairs (G1, f1), . . . , (Gs, fs) ∈ M(G0,O) and an operation
o ∈ Os, the class M(G0,O) contains the pair (G, f) where G = o(G1, . . . , Gs) and
f = o(f1, . . . , fs).
We observe, that in the process of constructing the homomorphism f : G → H we
also produce the derivation trees of the groups G and H . A realization of these general
schemes in finite matrix groups will be considered in the next subsection.
3.2 Generating matrix groups. Let us define the classes G0,G of groups and the set
O of operations. First, we set
G = ∪n ∪R {G : G is a subgroup of GL(n,R)}
where n and R run over natural numbers and finite commutative rings respectively. Thus
any G ∈ G is a group of n × n invertible matrices with entries belonging to R for some
n ∈ N and some finite commutative ring R. We recall that any such ring is a direct
sum of local commutative rings and each of the latter can be described via appropriate
Galois ring: the Galois ring GR(pm, r) of characteristic pm and rank r is Zpm [x]/(f) where
f ∈ Zpm [x] is a monic polynomial of degree r whose image in Zp[x] is irreducible (see [17]).
Proposition 3.1 [17, 25] Let R be a finite commutative local ring of characteristic pm
and F = GF(pr) the residue field of R. Then
(1) R× = T × (1R +Rad(R)) where T is a cyclic group isomorphic to F
×,
(2) the subring R0 of R generated by T is a Galois ring GR(p
m, r),
(3) R is a homomorphic image of the ring R0[X1, . . . , Xt] where t is the minimal size
of a generator set of the radical of R.
Proposition 3.2 [17] Let p be a prime and m, r be natural numbers. Then
(1) there exists the unique up to isomorphism Galois ring GR(pm, r) of characteristic
pm and rank r,
(2) each element r ∈ GR(pm, r) is uniquely represented in the form r =
∑m−1
i=0 tip
i where
ti ∈ T ∪ {0} for all i,
(3) given σ ∈ Aut(F) the mapping r 7→
∑m−1
i=0 t
σ
i p
i where σ is the automorphism of the
group T induced by σ (see statement (1) of Proposition 3.1), is an automorphism
of GR(pm, r).
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Due to statements (2),(3) of Proposition 3.1 and statements (2) of Proposition 3.2 a
representation of the finite commutative ring R (resp., the group G) can be chosen to be
polynomial in log(|R|) (resp. in n and log(|R|)). We also admit a hidden representation of
R in which the decomposition in local summands is not presented explicitly, for example
the ring of residues modulo an integer can be completely given by indicating this integer.
We define a set G0 ⊂ G to be a class of classical simple (including abelian) subgroups
G of the groups GL(n,F) where n ∈ N and F is a finite field. Any such group G ∈ G0
is given by a set of generators so that the Membership Testing Problem can be solved in
time polynomial in n and in the bit size of F. (Indeed, any nonabelian classical matrix
group can be given together with a suitable matrix representation which can be used
for testing membership; for an abelian group of a prime order p one can use, e.g. the
two-dimensional representation
Z
+
p → GL(2, p), x 7→
(
1 x
0 1
)
(5)
which gives a trivial membership testing algorithm). In fact, it is not necessary that
G0 contains all classical groups; one can form G0 from the group of special types, e.g.
PSL(n,F) or something like that. Since the elements of G0 are parametrized by the tuples
of naturals, one can efficiently choose a random group G ∈ G0 with a given size L(G) of
presentation.
The choice of the set O of operations was inspired by the Aschbacher theorem [2] on
classifying maximal subgroups of classical groups. Let us describe the operations.
Changing the underlying ring. Let R be a finite commutative ring and R′ be an
extension of R. Then the natural monomorphism
ϕ : GL(n,R)→ GL(n,R′)
gives an unary operation in G taking G ∈ G to ϕ(G). This operation can be performed
efficiently whenever e.g. the embedding R to R′ is given explicitly and the number d =
[(R′)+ : R+] is small. Another example is the extension of Zm to Zm′ where m is a divisor
of m′. Conversely, any embedding of the ring R′ into the ring Mat(d,R) induces the
natural monomorphism
ϕ′ : GL(n,R′)→ GL(nd,R)
taking a matrix of GL(n,R′) to the block matrix of GL(nd,R) with d2 blocks of size n.
(Such a situation arises e.g. when R′ is a field of the order qd and R is its subfield of
the order q, or when R′ is isomorphic to the direct sum of d copies of R.) This produces
another unary operation in G taking G ∈ G to ϕ′(G). In order not to blow up the
representation one should assume that d is small. In both cases the isomorphism type of
the group G (as an abstract group) does not change, but the operations change it as a
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linear group. In fact, our constructions start with matrix groups over a finite field F. To
pass to rings one can use standard extensions with R = F and R′ = Mat(m,R), and also
with R = Mat(n, p) and R′ = Mat(m,Zpd) with a prime p.
Direct products. Suppose that groups G1, . . . , Gs ∈ G are such that Gi ≤ GL(ni, R)
where ni ∈ N and R is a finite commutative ring. Then
G = G1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Gs ≤ GL(n,R)
where n =
∏s
i=1 ni, and we obtain an s-ary operation in G. A set of generators for the
group G can be efficiently constructed from the generating sets for G1, . . . , Gs by means
of the Kronecker product of the corresponding matrices. When R is a field the group G
is irreducible iff so are the groups G1, . . . , Gs. (A matrix group G is called irreducible if
the underlying linear space contains no nontrivial G-invariant subspaces.)
Similarly, if m = ni, Gi ∩ G
′
i = {Im} and G
′
i normalizes Gi where i = 1, . . . , s and G
′
i
is the group generated by Gj, j 6= i, then G1 × · · ·×Gs is a subgroup of GL(m,R) which
gives one more m-ary operation.
Wreath products. The wreath product G ≀ Γ of a group G and a permutation group
Γ ≤ Sym(m) is defined to be the semidirect product of the m-fold direct product Gm =
G × · · · × G by the group Γ acting on Gm via coordinatewise permutations. If G ≤
GL(n,R), then the group G ≀ Γ has two natural linear representations obtained from the
natural monomorphisms
Gm → GL(nm,R), Gm → GL(nm, R),
the first of which is induced by them-fold direct sum of the underlying R-module, whereas
the second one is induced by them-fold tensor product of it. The images of the group G≀Γ
are called the imprimitive and the product actions of the wreath product, respectively.
Thus we obtain two more efficiently computable m-ary operations in G. In the case of
R being a field the resulting groups are always irreducible whenever G is irreducible and
Γ is transitive. For our purpose it is enough to set Γ to be the symmetric group. More
elaborated way could be based on the fact that any transitive group is obtained from
the action of a group on the set of right cosets by some subgroup by means of right
multiplications.
Conjugations. An obvious unary operation in G consists in the conjugation of a
group G ∈ GL(n,R) by means of a randomly chosen matrix from GL(n,R). Such an
operation enables us to hide the form of a generator set of the group G.
LetO be the set of the above operations and G∗ ⊂ G be the set of all groupsG such that
(G, T ) ∈ P(G0,O) for some rooted labeled tree T (see Subsection 3.1). In the following
statement we consider the specializations of the problems MT (see Subsection 2.3) and
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LTP (see Subsection 1.3) for the class G∗. In both cases we suppose that the group
G ∈ G∗ is given by a set of generators. If G ≤ GL(n,R) for a certain n ∈ N and for
a finite commutative ring R, then in the case of LTP we set V to be the standard free
R-module of dimension n on which the group GL(n,R) acts, whereas for MT problem we
set F = GL(n,R).
Lemma 3.3 Let G ∈ G∗. Then given a derivation tree of G the problems MT and LTP
can be solved in time polynomial in L(G).
Proof. Let T be a derivation tree of G. Then the labels of the leaves of T are the groups
G1, . . . , Gt ∈ G0. Due to the choice of G0 the problems MT and LTP can be solved for the
group Gi in time polynomial in L(Gi) for i = 1, . . . , t. Since L(G) = L(T )
O(1), it suffices
to verify that by means of the tree T the problems can be reduced in time L(T )O(1) to
the corresponding problems for G1, . . . , Gt. For this purpose let us consider, for instance,
the reduction in the case of the primitive wreath product G = H ≀ Γ with H ≤ GL(n,R)
and Γ = Sym(m) (other operations from O on groups are treated in a similar way). Then
G ≤ GL(nm, R) and since T is given, we know the decomposition
V = U ⊗ · · · ⊗ U (m times)
where V and U are the standard R-modules for groups GL(nm, R) and GL(n,R) respec-
tively. Any element g ∈ G can be represented as the pair (h, k) ∈ Hm × Sym(m) such
that
(u1, . . . , um)
g = (u
hi1
i1
, . . . , u
him
im
) (6)
where h = (h1, . . . , hm) and ij = j
k−1 for j = 1, . . . , m. Now the permutation k can be
efficiently computed from the elements of the form (0R, . . . , 1R, . . . , 0R)
g (with 1R being
the unique nonzero component in a certain place). So the element h = gg−1k also can
be found efficiently where gk is the element of GL(V ) = GL(n
m, R) corresponding to k
(this element acts on V exactly by permuting coordinates according to k). In particular,
this provides a polynomial time reduction of the MT problem for G to the corresponding
problem for H .
Next, proceeding to the LTP problem let v ∈ uG for some u, v ∈ V . Denote by D
the bipartite graph with parts being the multisets {u1, . . . , um} and {v1, . . . , vm} and the
edges being the pairs (ui, vj) for which vi ∈ (uj)
H . Then from (6) it follows that there is a
one to one correspondence between the matchings {(ui, vji) : i = 1, . . . , m} of the graph
D and the set {k ∈ Γ : v = ug with g = (h, k) ∈ G for some h ∈ Hm}. Since the problem
of finding a matching of a bipartite graph can be solved efficiently, we see that the LTP
problem for G is polynomial time reducible to the corresponding problem for H .
A natural way to apply our construction to the key agreement protocol is to choose a
random group G ∈ G∗ of a prescribed size and then choose random subgroups GA and GB
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of G (see (1)). These groups can be specified by sets of generators constructed as follows:
Step 1. Let S be the set of leaves of the derivation tree of the group G. For each s ∈ S
take random subsets XA(s) and XB(s) of the group Hs associated with s.
Step 2. Using the natural embedding h → gh of Hs into G output XA = {gx : x ∈
XA(s), s ∈ S} and XB = {gx : x ∈ XB(s), s ∈ S} as the generator sets of GA and GB
respectively.
Thus, the constructing of the groups GA and GB is performed simultaneously with the
constructing the group G. (In fact, all we need is the embedding of each group assigned
to a leaf of the derivation tree of the group G into G.) In this way it is possible to control
some properties of the groups, for instance, to avoid the situation when GA centralizes
GB (then the common key coincides with 1G and so is not secure).
Applying our construction to design homomorphic cryptosystems is more delicate.
First of all we define the set M(G) for each group G ≤ GL(n,R) for some n ∈ N and
some finite commutative ring R (note that this covers the case G ∈ G0 and also allows
one to produce homomorphisms in one more way: replacing G0 by a bigger subclass of
G). Namely, any automorphism σ ∈ Aut(R) induces a homomorphism
fσ : G→ G
σ, A 7→ Aσ
where the matrix Aσ ∈ GL(n,R) is obtained from the matrix A ∈ GL(n,R) by entry-wise
applying of σ. To choose σ we observe that R = ⊕i∈IRi where each Ri is a finite local
commutative ring. Any automorphism of the residue field of the ring Ri can be lifted to
the automorphism of this ring (statement (3) of Proposition 3.2). In the representation of
the Galois ring as a quotient ring of a ring of polynomials this lifting can be done efficiently.
Taking any collection {σi}i∈I one can construct the automorphism σ ∈ Aut(R) such that
σ|Ri = σi for all i. The set of such automorphisms we denote by Aut0(R) (in the case of
R being a field this group coincides with Aut(R)). Set
M(G) = f0 ∪ {fσ : σ ∈ Aut0(R)} (7)
where f0 is a trivial homomorphism taking any element of G to the identity matrix of
GL(n,R). Then assuming that the ring R is given explicitly, one can choose a random
element of M(G) in time polynomial in L(G).
To provide the recursive step in constructing homomorphisms take o ∈ Os, s ≥ 1.
Suppose first that s = 1. Then o is an unary operation, i.e. either it changes the
underlying ring R of a group G ≤ GL(n,R), or o is a conjugation. Given a homomorphism
f : G → H with H ≤ GL(n,R) we set o(f) to be the composition o ◦ f . Let now s > 1
and fi : Gi → Hi be a homomorphism with Gi, Hi ∈ G
∗ for i = 1, . . . , s. Then there exists
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the natural canonical homomorphism
o(f1, . . . , fs) : o(G1, . . . , Gs)→ o(H1, . . . , Hs)
coinciding with fi on the group Gi which in this case is a subgroup of the group
o(G1, . . . , Gs). In any case, the resulting homomorphism is efficiently computable (we
recall that we represent a homomorphism by listing explicitly the images of the genera-
tors). The above discussion shows that the following statement holds.
Lemma 3.4 Let f : G → H be a homomorphism constructed in the above way where
G,H ∈ G∗. Then given the derivation tree of G one can find f(g) for g ∈ G in time
polynomial in L(G) and the size of g.
3.3 Secure generation. Let us fix the classes G0,G,G
∗, the set O of operations and
the sets M(G) for G ∈ G0 as in Subsection 3.2. Then due to Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4 one
can construct groups G ∈ G∗ to realize both key agreement protocols and homomorphic
cryptosystems in which the group G and the derivation tree T of it play the roles of public
and secret keys, respectively. The security of such systems is based on the difficulty of
the following problem.
Decomposition Problem. Given a group G ∈ G∗ find a derivation tree T of G.
This problem arises in connection with a computational version of the above mentioned
Aschbacher’s theorem. A number of practical algorithms (without complexity bounds)
for Decomposition Problem are known (see [14]) but in general this problem seems to be
difficult. Indeed, suppose that R = Zm where m = pq with p and q being two different
primes. Denote by Gp the cyclic matrix group of the order p in GL(2, p) (see (5)).
Similarly, the group Gq is defined. Then Gp, Gq ∈ G0 and
G = G′p ×G
′
q ≤ GL(2, R)
where G′p and G
′
q are the images of the groups Gp and Gq with respect to the natural
embeddings GL(2, p) and GL(2, q) into GL(2, R). Thus the group G can be constructed in
two steps: construct the groupsG′p andG
′
q (the operation of changing the underlying ring),
and set G = G′1×G
′
2 (the operation of the direct product). This implies that G ∈ G
∗. This
shows that the integer factoring problem is a special case of the Decomposition Problem.
Another strategy of Charlie could be to avoid solving the Decomposition Problem and
to try solve the problems like LTP, SCSP or CMT directly. To prevent such an attack
one can choose the leaves of the derivation tree of the group G to be the groups of the
exponential size with respect to L(G). Then from the construction it follows that these
groups will arise as the composition factors of G. However, for the groups with large
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composition factors all the problems like LTP, SCSP or CMT seem to be difficult (see
Subsections 1.3 and 2.3).
We mention one more attack of Charlie for the case of a homomorphic cryptosystem.
Suppose we construct in the above way the homomorphism f : G → H with G,H ∈ G∗.
We call the homomorphism linear if it induces the ring homomorphism f ′ : A(G)→ A(H)
where A(G) (resp. A(H)) is the subring of the underlying full matrix ring generated by
G (resp. H). For a linear homomorphism the corresponding homomorphic cryptosystem
can be easily broken whenever G ≤ GL(n,R) where R = Zn for some n ∈ N or R is a
finite field (or, more generally, a direct sum of Galois rings). Indeed, in this case Charlie
can find f(g) for g ∈ G as follows. Take random generators g1, . . . , gs of the group G
and find a decomposition g =
∑s
i=1 cigi with ci ∈ R just involving linear algebra. Then
f(g) =
∑s
i=1 cif(gi) due to the linearity of f . To prevent this attack one can take some
initial homomorphisms at the leaves of the derivation tree to be elements of the group
Aut0(R) (see (7)). Then the constructed homomorphism is not linear in general (e.g. if
g ∈ GL(n,F) with F being a field, and σ ∈ Aut(F), then generally (ag)σ 6= agσ).
We complete the subsection by the following statement summarizing the above dis-
cussion.
Theorem 3.5 Assuming that the problems LTP, SCSP, CMT for matrix groups over
finite commutative rings, as well as the Decomposition Problem are intractable, a secure
two-party key agreement protocol and homomorphic cryptosystem can be implemented for
these groups.
One of the consequences of this theorem is that by means of it one can construct
encrypted simulation of a boolean circuit of the logarithmic depth (the details can be
found in [10]).
Final remarks
One of the main problems in constructing homomorphic public-key cryptosystems con-
sists in finding appropriate trapdoor functions. However, in the natural presentations of
homomorphisms of algebraic structures the problem of breaking such a system is reduced
to some variants of the CMT problem. On the other hand, there is the following result
for matrix groups over finite fields.
Theorem 3.6 [12, Theorem 6.1] Given K = 〈X〉 ≤ GL(d, pe) where X ⊂ GL(d, pe),
there is a Las Vegas algorithm that given any g ∈ GL(d, pe), decides whether g ∈ K, and
if g ∈ K, then the algorithm produces a straight-line program with the input X, yielding
g. The algorithm uses an oracle to compute discrete logarithms in fields of characteristic
p with sizes up to ped. In case when all of those composition factors of Lie type in
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characteristic p are constructively recognizable with a Discrete Log oracle 1, the running
time is a polynomial in the input length |X|d2e log p, plus the time required for polynomially
many calls to the Discrete Log oracle.
This theorem shows that having an oracle for the Discrete Logarithm, the membership
problem can be solved in probabilistic polynomial time for matrix groups over finite fields.
This means that at least for homomorphic public-key cryptosystems over such groups
there is a little hope to find a trapdoor function different from functions the difficulty of
inversion of which is based on the intractability of the Discrete Logarithm. However, only
a little is known on the computational complexity of the membership problem for matrix
groups over rings. So constructions over such groups seems to be more perspective from
the point of view of algebraic (non-commutative) cryptography.
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